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In safety engineering there are several risk assessment methods ranged from simple to complex, quantitative or 
qualitative and semi-quantitative. May be researchers or experts they need to answer the question: (which 
method we choose and why?). It may sometimes be necessary to employ more than one method of assessment. 
Two approached conducted the first approach discussed the selection of risk assessment method in consideration 
of availability of resources, uncertainty and factors influencing method selection. While the second approach 
discuss the selection criteria accordance of consequence assessment and frequency assessment. It found that the 
selection of methods affected mainly by environment under consideration. After this analysis it is suitable to 
conduct the risk assessment for the case study by using HAZOP as qualitative methodology and for quantitative 
FTA will be conducted. It is possible to mix the two approaches to form one model for selection process. 
Keywords: risk assessment; selection; method; qualitative; quantitative. 
1. Introduction 
Since selecting an appropriate hazard evaluation technique is more an art than a science, there may be no “best” 
method for a particular application. The thought process behind selecting hazard evaluation techniques is 
complex, and a variety of factors can influence the decision-making process. [1]  In safety engineering there are 
several risk assessment methods ranged from simple to complex, quantitative or qualitative and semi-
quantitative more than 25 techniques and tools, were discussed in risk assessment literature [1, 6, 7, 8,9,10 
&11].  
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May as researchers and experts attempt to answer the question: (which method we choose and why?) their work 
covered wide range of application from agriculture, mining, engineering and industries [8, 9, 14] non-of them 
claimed an optimal due to selection procedure associated with future prediction. The aim of this paper is 
therefore to contribute to these efforts. This paper will focus on discussing the cross-compatibility between risk 
assessment methodologies, as well as describes how to select suitable risk assessment methodology. And further 
explain a range of tools and techniques that can be used to perform a risk assessment or to assist with the risk 
assessment process. It may sometimes be necessary to employ more than one method of assessment.  Two 
approaches adopted: The first approach discussed the selection of risk assessment method in consideration of 
availability of resources, uncertainty and factors influencing selection of methods. While the second approach 
discussed the selection criteria in accordance of consequence assessment and frequency assessment. In the case 
study the two approaches are utilized to select suitable methods.    
2. Methods 
Two approaches are employed to achieve the objectives. 
2.1 Risk Assessment Methods Selection 
Risk assessment may be undertaken in varying degrees of depth and detail and using one or many methods 
ranging from simple to complex. The form of assessment and its output should be consistent with the risk 
criteria developed as part of establishing the context. In general terms, suitable techniques should exhibit the 
following characteristics: [2] 
 it should be justifiable and appropriate to the situation or organization under consideration; 
 it should provide results in a form which enhances understanding of the nature of the risk and how it 
can be treated; 
 it should be capable of use in a manner that is traceable, repeatable and verifiable. 
The reasons for the choice of techniques should be given, with regard to relevance and suitability. When 
integrating the results from different studies, the techniques used and outputs should be comparable.  Once the 
decision has been made to perform a risk assessment and the objectives and scope have been defined, the 
techniques should be selected, based on applicable factors such as: [2] 
 The objectives of the study. For example, if a comparative study between different options is being 
undertaken, it may be acceptable to use less detailed consequence models for parts of the system not 
affected by the difference; 
 The needs of decision-makers. In some cases a high level of detail is needed to make a good decision, 
in others a more general understanding is sufficient; 
 the type and range of risks being analyzed; 
 The potential magnitude of the consequences. The decision on the depth to which risk assessment is 
carried out should reflect the initial perception of consequences (although this may have to be modified 




once a preliminary evaluation has been completed); 
 The degree of expertise, human and other resources needed. A simple method, well done, may provide 
better results than a more sophisticated procedure poorly done, so long as it meets the objectives and 
scope of the assessment. Ordinarily, the effort put into the assessment should be consistent with the 
potential level of risk being analyzed; 
 The availability of information and data. Some techniques require more information and data than 
others; 
 The need for modification/updating of the risk assessment. The assessment may need to be 
modified/updated in future and some techniques are more amendable than others in this regard; 
 Any regulatory and contractual requirements. 
Various factors influence the selection of an approach to risk assessment such as the availability of resources; 
the nature and degree of uncertainty in the data and information available, and the complexity of the application 
(see Table.2). 
2.1.2 Availability of resources 
Resources and capabilities which may affect the choice of risk assessment techniques include: [2] 
 the skills experience capacity and capability of the risk assessment team; 
 constraints on time and other resources within the organization; 
 the budget available if external resources are required. 
2.1.3 The nature and degree of uncertainty 
The nature and degree of uncertainty requires an understanding of the quality, quantity and integrity of 
information available concerning the risk under consideration. This includes the extent to which sufficient 
information about the risk, its sources and causes, and its consequences to the achievement of objectives is 
available [2]. Available data do not always provide a reliable basis for the prediction of the future. For unique 
types of risks, historical data may not be available or there may be different interpretations of available data by 
different stakeholders. Those undertaking risk assessment need to understand the type and nature of the 
uncertainty and appreciate the implications for the reliability of the risk assessment results. These should always 
be communicated to decision-makers [2]. 
2.1.4 Application of risk assessment during life cycle phases 
Risk assessment can be applied at all stages of the life cycle and is usually applied many times with different 
levels of detail to assist in the decisions that need to be made at each phase. Life cycle phases have different 
needs and require different techniques For example during the concept and definition phase, when an 
opportunity is identified, risk assessment may be used to decide whether to proceed or not [2]. Where several 
options are available, risk assessment can be used to evaluate alternative concepts to help decide which provides 
the best balance of risks. 




During the design and development phase, risk assessment contributes to: [2] 
 ensuring that system risks are tolerable, 
 the design refinement process, 
 cost effectiveness studies, 
 identifying risks impacting upon subsequent life-cycle phases. 
As the activity proceeds, risk assessment can be used to provide information to assist in developing procedures 
for normal and emergency conditions [2]. 
2.1.5 Factors influencing selection of risk assessment techniques 
Next the attributes of the methods are described in terms of: [2] 
 Complexity of the problem and the methods needed to analyze it, 
 The nature and degree of uncertainty of the risk assessment based on the amount of information 
available and what is required to satisfy objectives, 
 The extent of resources required in terms of time and level of expertise, data needs or cost, 
 Whether the method can provide a quantitative output. 
The following factors should be considered in the selection of a risk assessment method: [4] 
• Cost:  
• External influences:  
• Agreement:  
• Organizational structure:  
• Adaptability: A method must be able to adapt to an organization’s needs.  
• Complexity  
• Completeness  
• Level of risk 
• Organizational size 
• Organizational security philosophy  
• Consistency:  




• Usability:  
• Feasibility  
• Validity:  
• Credibility:  
• Automation: Automated methods are faster, however the associated loss of human intuition and creativity 
may led to less economical and less efficient safeguards being selected.  
Table 1: Comparison of Hazard Evaluation and Risk Assessment Methods (1) 
 
The mentioned factors easily can employed to the Table-1 which shows the comparison of hazard evaluation 










Table 2: Applicability of tools used for risk assessment [2] 
 
     Methods meet the minimum criteria for the case stud
2.2 Selecting the Appropriate Technique 
Each hazard evaluation technique has unique strengths and weaknesses. Understanding these strengths and 




weaknesses is important in selecting the appropriate hazard evaluation technique. The process of selecting an 
appropriate hazard evaluation technique may be difficult for an inexperienced facilitator because the "best" 
technique may not be apparent. As hazard analysts gain experience with various hazard evaluation methods, the 
task of choosing an appropriate technique becomes easier and somewhat instinctive [5]. 
2.2.1 Consequence / Impact Assessment 
The incidents of concern within the process industries are often, but not always, associated with the loss of 
containment of material from the process. The material has hazardous properties, which might include toxicity 
and energy content (e.g., thermal, pressure, or potential combustion energy). Typical incident scenarios might 
include the rupture or break of a pipeline, a hole in a tank, a runaway reaction in a vessel, fire external to the 
vessel causing a relief valve to open, an operator erroneously opening a vent or drain valve, etc. Once the 
incident is defined, a source model(s) is selected to describe how materials are discharged from the process. The 
source model provides a description of the rate of discharge, the total quantity discharged (or total time of 
discharge), and the state of the discharge (solid, liquid, vapor, or a combination). Typically, a dispersion model 
is subsequently used to describe how the material is transported downwind and mixes with air to some 
concentration level [5]. For toxic releases, effect models consider the concentration and duration of exposure 
and the mode of physiological impact to convert these incident-specific results into effects on people (injury or 
death). For flammable releases, fire and explosion models convert information on the concentration and mass of 
material present (and, perhaps, information describing the physical environment of the flammable cloud) into 
energy hazard potentials such as thermal radiation and explosion overpressures. Other effect models are then 
used to estimate effects on people and structures. Additional refinement to consequence estimates may be 
provided by consideration of mitigation factors, such as isolation systems that might reduce the duration of the 
release or water sprays, foam systems, and sheltering or evacuation that may reduce the magnitude of potential 
effects [5]. 
2.2.2 Frequency Assessment 
Guidelines for Engineering Design for Process Safety [5] provides detailed information on the most common 
techniques to answer the question: "How often might this incident scenario occur?” Frequency assessment 
techniques include: 
 Review of historical records of similar events 
 Fault tree analysis 
 Event tree analysis 
 Layer of protection analysis 
 External event analysis 
 Common cause failure analysis 
 Human reliability analysis 
In performing frequency analyses, it is often difficult to determine the appropriate level of detail needed to 




provide sufficient information to make the necessary risk-based decision. Typically, a phased approach, such as 
the following, should be considered in performing frequency analysis: [5] 
• Perform a qualitative study using, for example, HAZOP or What-if Analysis to identify potential initiating 
events that could lead to incident scenarios of interest. 
• For initiating events of interest, prepare an event tree to further develop the scenarios; e.g., showing the 
various outcomes which could result based upon the success or failure of relevant protective features. 
• Use techniques such as fault tree analysis or the review of historical records to estimate the initiating event 
frequencies and branch point probabilities for each scenario. 
• Calculate the frequency estimates for each scenario outcome by multiplying the initiating event frequency by 
the appropriate branch point probabilities. Often simplified frequency analyses are performed by providing 



















Table 3: CCPS/AIChE, Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures [1] 
 





To apply the selection approaches case study suggested risk assessment for Crude Oil Storage Tank. The 
selection process for risk assessment methods will be as follow:  
3.1 Selection Procedure Framework 
Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures (CCPS/AIChE) Table-3 conducted according to the following 
sequence: 
1- Motivation: special requirements for academic study. 
2- Determine type of result needed: list of hazards and input for QRA. 
3- Process information: Process and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&ID). 
4- Examine characteristics of the problem:  
 Complexity: simple 
 Type of process: chemical 
 Type of operation: fixed facility 
 Nature of hazards: flammable/ explosively 
 Situation of incident event concerned: multiple failure 
5- Consider perceive risk and experience: 
 Length of experience: long 
 Incident experience: many 
 Relevance of experience: no change 
   Perceived risk: high  
6- Consider resource and preference: availability of skilled personnel.  
3.2 Justification 
1- Comparison of hazard evaluation and risk assessment method, table-1, the most suitable method for this case 
is HAZOP as Qualitative analysis method because it can offer sufficient details to conduct quantitative analysis. 
Moreover it is common used in such cases. While for Quantitative analysis: LOPA, FTA and ETA found 
suitable methods for the case study, but LOPA may need more details. So the study as a comparison case can be 
conducted by FTA or ETA and that is common used. 
2- According to Table -2, it found that HAZOP has the possibility of function analysis which can provide hazard 




analysis in sufficient details for process equipment. As quantitative analysis FTA and ETA they have the same 
bath of scenario analysis so any of them can be used for conducting quantitative analysis after HAZOP.  
3- According to Table -3, it is found that HAZOP strongly applicable for identifying hazard and analyzing 
consequence. And it is applicable for probability analysis, risk level analysis and risk evaluation. 
On the hand for quantitative analysis: 
 FTA strongly applicable for probability analysis. And it is applicable for identifying hazard, risk level 
analysis and risk evaluation. Not applicable for analyzing consequence. 
 ETA strongly applicable for and analyzing consequence. And it is applicable for probability analysis, 
risk level analysis and identifying. Not applicable for risk evaluation. 
 LOPA strongly applicable for probability analysis. And it is applicable for identifying hazard, risk level 
analysis and analyzing consequence. Not applicable for risk evaluation. 
Any one of FTA, ETA or LOPA can be employed with HAZOP. FTA selected to conduct risk evaluation in this 
case study. 
3.3 Conclusion 
After this analysis it is suitable to conduct the risk assessment for the case study by using HAZOP as qualitative 
methodology and for quantitative FTA will be conducted. There is a possibility to mix the two approaches to 
form one model for selection process. 
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